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PART III  Development and Projects of Regional Leadership   
U.S. and Chinese Silk Road Initiatives: Towards a 
Geopolitics of Flows in Central Asia and Beyond
Mika Aaltola and Juha Käpylä
When the geostrategic gaze meets the geography of Central Asia, the scene
can be communicated to wider audiences when the description connects with
conventional historical knowledge and invokes imaginaries of a glorious and
famous distant past to build identities for the present. The specific contours
of the geographic landscape are then reimaged in terms of the possibilities
they seem to possess when being transformed by the new functions which
make them part of a strategic idea. Both the U.S. and Chinese strategic vi-
sions for the future of Central Asia are based on the Silk Road concept. The
Silk Road originally refers to the ancient trade and cultural routes between
China and South and Central Asia, Europe and the Middle East that started to
emerge already during the Han dynasty in the 2nd century BC and met their
ultimate demise with the rise of the growing influence of Tsarist Russia and
then the Soviet Union in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Since the 1990s, the
concept has resurfaced in the context of various logistics and energy projects
across the greater Central Asian region.1 This chapter focuses on two recent
Silk Road initiatives by the U.S. and China––on their design, intent and con-
sequences in Central Asia in the context of the U.S. withdrawal from Af-
ghanistan.
Strategic thought emerges from the context of some actual political prob-
lem that cannot be solved by routine action and the means previously availa-
ble. For the U.S., the central problem in contemporary Central Asia has been
Afghanistan: how to create sustainable economic and political conditions in
the country after the withdrawal of U.S. military presence while at the same
time responding to global geopolitical games involving other great powers.
For China, the problematic has been more complex, involving domestic secu-
rity and economic issues in Western China, regional security issues in Cen-
                                                          
1 Sreemati Ganguli, “The Revival of the Silk Roads Topic: A Contemporary Analysis,” in 
Mapping Central Asia: Indian Perceptions and Strategies, ed. Marlène Laurelle et al. 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 61–72. 
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tral Asia, global geostrategic scenarios following the U.S. rebalancing to
Asia, as well as energy and trade factors in (and beyond) the region. The two
Silk Road concepts represent contemporary solutions to these dilemmas. Fol-
lowing pragmatist insight, strategic ideas are best understood as “rules of
action”2; they are not abstract reflections or even accurate representations3,
but intimately related to organizing new action, thus having practical effects
in socio-political reality.
From the U.S. perspective, the global space is organized according to
U.S.-centric networks.4 These networks are comprised of logistic flows of
resources, people, goods, and data. The focus is on the ways in which these
flow-systems with their hub-and-spoke topologies combine with circulations
of power. Mobility networks become signs of a landscape that has been mas-
tered. This vision contrasts with decaying or non-existing networks that often
signify anarchy.5 The hub-and-spoke structure has a history of being read as
a “health indicator” of mastered environments. Ikenberry, for example, draws
an explicit parallel between the changing global power hierarchy and the air-
mobility systems, where all “major power centers (airlines) have their own
distinct and competing hub and spoke system.” 6
The transformation into a hub-and-spoke pattern is what Ikenberry indi-
cates might be happening to the global hierarchy of power. Ikenberry makes
a distinction between a more unipolar hub-and-spoke arrangement and a mul-
tilateralist situation, where actors coordinate their actions based on mutually
agreed upon and shared rules and principles. The earlier Pax Americana hub-
and-spoke relationship was clearly more unilateralist: one hub makes the de-
cisions and expects the spokes to conform.7 In his later 2009 analogy, the
hub and spoke is considerably more “fragmented,” with the emergence of
                                                          
2 Charles Sanders Peirce, “How to Make our Ideas Clear,” in Pragmatism: A Reader, ed. 
Louis Menand (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), 33.
3 This is a particularly “neo-pragmatist” claim; see e.g. Juha Käpylä and Harri Mikkola, 
“‘Getting Things Right?’: A Reconsideration of Critical Realism as a Metatheory for IR,” 
Journal of International Relations and Development 14, no. 4 (2011): 413–14.
4 See e.g. Mika Aaltola, “The international airport: The hub-and-spoke pedagogy of the 
American empire,” Global Networks 5, no. 3 (2005): 261–78; Mika Aaltola, Juha Käpylä,
and Valtteri Vuorisalo, The Challenge of Global Commons and Flows for US Power: The 
Perils of Missing the Human Domain (New York: Ashgate, 2014).
5 Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” The Atlantic Monthly 273, no. 2 (February 
1994): 44–77.
6 G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition: Essays on American Power and 
World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 85.
7 Ibid., 241, 248.
209
competing China as a hub that has partially overlapping spokes with the
American-led liberal hub (thereby instigating a growing need to compromise
on practices of governance). Thus, it seems that the geo-economics of
(asymmetric) interdependence is propelling ways of seeing strategic maps
and transforming landscapes that goes beyond mere traditional geopolitics.
With the emergence of U.S. and Chinese Silk Road initiatives, the geopoli-
tics of Central Asia can also be seen to be in transformation.
This chapter investigates the two strategic visions in and around Central
Asia: the U.S. “New Silk Road” and China’s “one belt, one highway” initia-
tives which primarily highlight the establishment of infrastructure for region-
al and global flows of resources, goods and people and which have strong
secondary geopolitical relevance. The two approaches are similar yet exhibit
particularities in design, execution and intent. The U.S. vision is Afghani-
stan-focused, vertical, multilateral and seen as a Central Asia-India connec-
tion. The Chinese vision is more diffuse, horizontal, bilateral and state-based
in its concrete investments, and seen as a broad march towards the west. The
key question is whether they can, or ought to be, read as competitive or com-
plementary. These contrary interpretations leave the future ambiguous from
the perspective of power politics. However, the two initiatives will have a
large impact on the daily lives of the people in the region, particularly when
they are integrated into the processes of global logistics and flows. The U.S.
initiative faces multiple challenges whereas the Chinese version, despite its
challenges, is the one which is more likely to shape practices in the region.
The U.S. Silk Road Initiative
A Regional Economic Strategy
In a speech on July 20, 2011 at Chennai in India, the Secretary of State Hilla-
ry Clinton laid out the outlines of the U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and Cen-
tral Asia after the withdrawal of the majority of U.S. (and ISAF) combat
forces from Afghanistan––at the time envisioned to take place by the end of
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2014 but today set to happen in 2016.8 The strategy was based on three ele-
ments: (1) a new strategic partnership framework to define the U.S.-
Afghanistan relationship after the U.S. withdrawal––a pact that was finally
signed in September 2014 following the power-sharing deal to secure the
new Afghan presidency for Ashraf Ghani;9 (2) active diplomatic efforts with
regional powers to facilitate a responsible political solution in Afghanistan,
including a chain of meetings in Istanbul, Bonn and Kabul to obtain formal
pledges of non-interference coupled with confidence-building measures from
regional players; and (3) an economic strategy to increase commercial ties
and activity in South and Central Asia so that goods, resources, capital, and
people could flow more easily across borders and, thus, enhance economic
growth in the region.10
Washington’s economic strategy took the form of the New Silk Road
(NSR) initiative. The primary focus of the NSR is Afghanistan, with the aim
of making Afghanistan economically and politically sustainable after the
withdrawal of the main part of the U.S. and ISAF forces. However, as Af-
ghanistan is unlikely to achieve this alone and isolated from its neighbors, the
NSR has a specific regional emphasis aimed at connecting and boosting all
the land-locked economies of Central Asia that are seen to possess vast natu-
ral resources and growing markets but to have remained relatively unin-
tegrated, both regionally and globally.11 The overarching idea of the initia-
                                                          
8 The U.S. will maintain a reduced military presence in post-2016 Afghanistan through 
NATO’s Operation Resolute Support (ORS), which will replace the Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF).
9 Steve Holland and David Brunnstrom, “Ghani named Afghan president-elect after deal to 
end election dispute,” Reuters, September 21, 2014,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/21/us-afghanistan-election-
idUSKBN0HG0PQ20140921.
10 Hillary Clinton, “Remarks on India and the United States: A Vision for the 21st Century,” 
U.S. Department of State (USDS), July 20, 2011, http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013
clinton/rm/2011/07/168840.htm; and Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban
Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service, CRS Report,
August 17, 2015, 30, 40–41, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf. 
11 Vladimir Fedorenko, “The New Silk Road Initiatives in Central Asia,” Rethink Paper 10
(2013): 2–3, http://www.rethinkinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Fedorenko-The-
New-Silk-Road.pdf and USDS, “U.S. Support for the New Silk Road,” accessed June 11, 
2015, http://www.state.gov/p/sca/ci/af/newsilkroad. Afghanistan, however, has been 
connected to various, often illicit, global networks and flows. From a historical perspective, 
Central Asian economies have long provided raw materials for industrial production in the 
USSR and later on Russia, which has meant that licit connections elsewhere––particularly 
to its southern neighbors––have remained relatively undeveloped. See e.g. Jonathan 
Mendel, “Afghanistan, Networks and Connectivity,” Geopolitics 15, no. 4 (2010): 726–51
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tive is that Afghanistan needs to move from aid-dependency to a sustainable
economy, and that this in turn requires the combination of government lead-
ership, private sector investment, and regional cooperation and connectivity.
As Secretary of State Clinton put it, “[f]or Afghans to enjoy sustainable
prosperity, they will have to work alongside all of their neighbors to shape a
more integrated economic future for the region that will create jobs and will
undercut the appeal of extremism.” 12
In more detail, the NSR initiative is a regional approach to peace and
prosperity in Afghanistan. It goes beyond the limited focus on Afghan inter-
nal dynamics or even Afghanistan-Pakistan relations and aims at integrating
the whole region into an international network of trade, transit, and commu-
nications links along the north-south axis with Afghanistan as the main hub–
–as the new “heart of Asia.”13 The goal, as Mankoff explains, is to connect
Afghanistan and its neighboring Central Asian countries to the growing
economies of South Asia––Pakistan and India––which in turn will help draw
in new foreign investment, open up new sources of hydrocarbons and miner-
als, and give Central Asian actors a stake in economic development that will
turn them away from violence and radicalism.14 In this vision, says Clinton,
“Turkmen gas fields could help meet both Pakistan’s and India’s growing
energy needs and provide significant transit revenues for both Afghanistan
and Pakistan. Tajik cotton could be turned into Indian linens. Furniture and
fruit from Afghanistan could find its way to the markets of Astana or Mum-
bai and beyond.” 15
The NSR initiative suggested the development of hard and soft infra-
structure as two particular ways of advancing trans-regional connectivity and
economic activity in Central and South Asia. The key part of the proposal
was the construction and extension of hard infrastructure in order to connect
                                                                                                                            
and Jeffrey Mankoff, “The United States and Central Asia after 2014,” Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, January 2013, 20,
http://csis.org/files/publication/130122_Mankoff_USCentralAsia_Web.pdf.
12 Hillary Clinton, “Remarks at the New Silk Road Ministerial Meeting,” USDS, September 
22, 2011, http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/09/173807.htm. 
13 Fedorenko, “The New Silk Road Initiatives,” 4, and Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, “Central Asia 
and Afghanistan: Insulation on the Silk Road, Between Eurasia and the Heart of Asia,” 
Peace Research Institute Oslo Paper 3 (2012),
http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/6912~v~Central_Asia_and_Afghanist
an__Insulation_on_the_Silk_Road_Between_Eurasia_and_the_Heart_of_Asia.pdf.
14 Mankoff, “The United States and Central Asia.”
15 Clinton, “Remarks at the New Silk Road Ministerial Meeting.” 
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Central Asian states to Pakistan and India via Afghanistan. In this task, the
U.S. State Department identified up to 40 infrastructure projects to pursue in
the region.16 These included initiatives to develop energy transmission net-
works, energy pipelines, transport connections (e.g. roads and railways) and
information networks (e.g. fiber optic cables). The two flagship projects in
the U.S. initiative, illustrated in Figure 1 and Figure 2, are the Turkmeni-
stan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) gas pipeline, which is to transport
Turkmen natural gas to growing markets in India that currently have only
half the natural gas that they require, and the CASA-100017 energy transmis-
sion network, which could transport surplus summer hydropower from Kyr-
gyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, all three of which
are states with significant energy deficits.18
Figure 1: TAPI Pipeline
Source: The Hindu (2014). Illustration: Kauko Kyöstiö.
These efforts complement existing infrastructure initiatives in the region that
the U.S. has supported diplomatically or through indirect financial support
via multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank (WB) or the Asian
Development Bank (ADB). The work of the Central Asia Regional Econom-
ic Cooperation (CAREC) program is a prime example.
                                                          
16 Joshua Kucera, “The New Silk Road?,” The Diplomat, November 11, 2011,
http://thediplomat.com/2011/11/the-new-silk-road/. 
17 CASA-1000, “CASA-1000,” accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.casa-1000.org/. 
18 Robert O. Blake, “The New Silk Road and Regional Economic Integration,” USDS, March 
13, 2013, http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2013/206167.htm and USDS, “U.S. Support 
for the New Silk Road.”
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CAREC is an ADB-coordinated development program that brings to-
gether 10 Asian countries and 6 multilateral institutions. It was established in
1997 to promote cooperative regional development, with the aim of acceler-
ated economic growth and poverty reduction. The backbone of CAREC is its
investments in transport and trade facilitation projects, to date worth of $18
billion. Since 2008, these projects have been pursued in the framework of
Trade and Transport Facilitation Strategy (TTFS), the goals of which include
“establishing competitive corridors; facilitating the movement of goods and
people through these corridors; and providing sustainable, safe, and user-
friendly transport and trade networks” through Central Asia.19 Among the
key projects are the six multimodal transport corridors that seek to facilitate
regional connectivity and trade flows. According to TTFS, some of the origi-
nal corridors remain incomplete, with inadequate connection to maritime
ports and intermodal logistics hubs. This limits their effectiveness in enabling
increased trade flows and necessitates ongoing improvement and exten-
sions.20 Many of these extensions currently seem to emphasize the north-
south focus of the NSR initiative even if they also serve broader interests,
including those of China in its own Silk Road initiative.
These regional hard infrastructure projects complement the multibillion
U.S. nation-building effort in Afghanistan,21 part of which has focused on
rebuilding infrastructure that could ultimately enable Afghanistan to become
the new crossroads of Asia. The U.S. has financed the construction or reha-
bilitation of over 3,000 km of roads as well as key bridges to facilitate trade,
transport and people-to-people connectivity in Afghanistan and beyond.
Prime examples are the 2,200-km-long Afghan Ring Road connecting major
Afghan cities and the $40 billion and the 672-meter-long Tajikistan-
                                                          
19 ADB, “CAREC Trade and Transportation Facilitation Strategy 2020,” 2014, 
http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/34107/files/carec-ttfs-
2020.pdf.
20 “CAREC Trade and Transportation Facilitation Strategy 2020,” 13.
21 The cost of Operation Enduring Freedom, and particularly of reconstruction efforts within 
that operation, is difficult to estimate, not least because of various funding sources. 
According to official figures for fiscal years 2001–2014, Congress granted the State
Department and USAID $33.6 billion, part of which was used for reconstruction. Similarly, 
the Department of Defense has been granted at least $647.3 billion, part of which has also 
been used for reconstruction in the context of counterinsurgency warfare. But it is safe to 
say that the total cost of reconstruction efforts is multiple billions of dollars. See Amy 
Belasco, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 
9/11,” Congressional Research Service, CRS Report, December 8, 2014, 19,
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf. 
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Afghanistan bridge across the Panj River.22 The U.S. has also provided fi-
nancial support for the construction of energy transmission lines, hydropower
plants and related reforms across the country, worth more than $2 billion in
total.23 According to one estimate, the most significant development has been
the connection of Afghanistan’s and Uzbekistan’s electricity grids for the
provision of electricity to Kabul and Mazar-e Sharif.24 In the cyber domain,
the U.S. has provided technical assistance to the establishment of a 4,000-
km-long network of fiber optic cables in the country.25
Figure 2: CASA-1000 electricity network
Source: CASA-100 Homepage. Illustration:
Kauko Kyöstiö.
                                                          
22 “US-made Tajik-Afghan bridge opens,” BBC, August 26, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6964429.stm. The bridge connecting Panji Poyon in 
Tajikistan and Shir Khan Bandar in Afghanistan was co-financed by Norway.
23 Lynne M. Tracy, “The United States and the New Silk Road,” USDS, October 25, 2013, 
http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2013/215906.htm.
24 Frederick S. Starr and Andrew C. Kuchins, “The Key to Success in Afghanistan: A Modern 
Silk Road Strategy,” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, Silk 
Road Paper, May 2010, 39,
http://csis.org/files/publication/100610_key_to_success_in_afghanistan.pdf.
25 Tracy, “The United States and the New Silk Road.”
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In addition to improving connectivity, the U.S. has also emphasized the crea-
tion of potential hubs and spokes for the emerging trade and transport flows
in and through Afghanistan. These have included the port of Shir Khan Ban-
dar26 in Kunduz province that began to grow after the completion of the ad-
jacent Tajikistan-Afghanistan bridge in 2007, as well as the port of Haira-
tan27 in Balkh province that hosts one of the country’s few international rail
connections.
The establishment of hubs and connections is also related to Afghani-
stan’s natural resources that could be extracted and shipped out in return for
revenue to sustain the country. Consequently, the development of extractive
industries in Afghanistan has also been identified as important, not least be-
cause the U.S. Geological Survey has verified that “Afghanistan sits on top
of at least $1 trillion in mineral wealth––iron, copper, gold, rare earth ele-
ments, and others.” 28
The rest of the U.S. proposals in the NSR initiative fell into the category
of soft infrastructure development that aims to accelerate the free flow of
resources, goods, services and people in the (assumedly) increasingly con-
nected region, particularly along the north-south axis. This amounts to an
attempt to pursue economic growth through trade liberalization while at the
same time seeking reduction in crime and corruption. While it is recognized
that the underdeveloped hard infrastructure (as well as the security situation)
in the region remains a formidable challenge, significant obstacles to smooth
cross-border trade are perceived to be institutional, bureaucratic and political
in nature. Inefficient border bureaucracy, corruption and rent-seeking, and
differing national regulations are seen to stall efficient movement, create un-
predictability, and add significantly to the cost of cross-border trade.29 In
order to alleviate this situation, the NSR initiative has emphasized the need to
                                                          
26 Ministry of Commerce and Industries of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Shir Khan 
Port,” accessed September 29, 2015, http://moci.gov.af/en/page/7760.
27 Ministry of Commerce and Industries of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Hairatan
port,” accessed September 29, 2015, http://moci.gov.af/en/page/7761.
28 Robert D. Hormats, “The United States’ ‘New Silk Road’ Strategy: What is it? Where is it 
Headed?,” USDS, September 29, 2011,
http://www.state.gov/e/rls/rmk/20092013/2011/174800.htm.
29 Starr and Kuchins, “The Key to Success in Afghanistan,” 26–28. It has been estimated that 
up to 40 percent of total travel time in EU-Central Asia trade may derive from delays at the 
borders, and up to 60 percent of the trip time in Central Asian shipping can be spent at 
border crossings; the latter alone may amount to over 60 percent of the overall cost (see 
Ibid., 33). 
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upgrade border crossing facilities and procedures, remove bureaucratic trade
barriers, and coordinate trade policies in the region.30 Increasingly profes-
sional customs administration and standardized customs procedures coupled
with more harmonized regional trade policies are expected to amount to sav-
ings in time and reductions in the cost of regional trade. U.S. activities in-
clude31:
• Support of various border security initiatives in the region to prevent 
the exploitation of growing trade and transit by terrorists, narco-
traffickers and other criminals. The U.S. State and Defense Depart-
ments have also increased the capacity of customs and border control
officials in all Central Asian countries as well as supported the work 
of the OSCE to train officials, several hundreds of whom are Afghans, 
both in its Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe and its Cus-
toms Academy in Bishkek. 
• Agreement with the Central Asian countries upon a Trade and Invest-
ment Framework Agreement (TIFA), through which the parties seek 
to identify opportunities for new economic activities and work toward 
the removal of impediments to trade and investment flows amongst the 
agreeing parties and Afghanistan. The U.S. has also provided tech-
nical assistance for the realization of the 2010 Afghanistan-Pakistan 
Transit Trade agreement (APTTA) and supported the Cross-Border 
Transport Agreement (CBTA) between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Afghanistan.32
• Support for Kazakhstan and Afghanistan has resulted in their accession 
to the WTO. The U.S. has also welcomed Uzbekistan’s efforts to re-
vive its WTO negotiations and Turkmenistan’s renewed interest in the 
organization. 
                                                          
30 Clinton, “Remarks at the New Silk Road Ministerial Meeting” and Susan M. Elliot, 
“Remarks at Northern Distribution Network Conference,” USDS, May 8, 2012, 
http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2012/189499.htm and see also Kucera, “The New Silk 
Road?.”
31 Tracy, “The United States and the New Silk Road” and USDS, “U.S. Support for the New 
Silk Road.”
32 ADB, “Afghanistan Joins Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic Cross-Border Transport Accord,” 
August 29, 2011, http://www.adb.org/news/afghanistan-joins-tajikistan-kyrgyz-republic-
cross-border-transport-accord.
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• Afghanistan’s decision to rejoin the International Road Transport 
Convention (IRTC) in 2013 was seen as a positive move by the U.S. 
as this convention harmonizes the formalities of transporting goods by 
road in all Central Asian countries. The U.S. has also helped to estab-
lish the National Rail Authority and develop a national rail plan to fa-
cilitate enhanced transport and logistics in the country.
Moreover, in addition to improving hard and soft infrastructure the NSR ini-
tiative also maintains that regional economic connectivity should involve a
people-to-people aspect and particularly the improvement of opportunities
for youth, women and minorities to participate in social and economic life in
Afghanistan and the broader region. This creates a conditional aspect to the
U.S. strategy and connects it to a broader recognition among Western experts
according to which “improving the status of Afghan [and Central Asian]
women and girls is also important for the nation’s [region’s] political devel-
opment and stabilization.”33 In order to support these aims in the context of
the NSR initiative, the U.S. has funded university studies of Afghan students
across the region, sponsored economic and entrepreneurship symposiums for
women in Central Asia and South Asia, and organized trade delegations and
conferences in the region.34
The U.S. Initiative in Its Long-Term Policy Perspective 
Contrary to the word “new” in the name of the initiative, the very idea of a
Silk Road is not a novelty in the U.S. strategic discourse on Central Asia.
The notion can be traced back to Washington’s broader geopolitical consid-
erations which, during the 1990s and 2000s, focused on democratic transi-
tion, human rights promotion and economic cooperation in “Greater Central
Asia,” thus ultimately connecting it to the Caucasus region, Turkey and Eu-
rope in the West rather than to the North (Russia) or the East (China). Kucera
notes how the U.S. in the late 1990s, “pushed for the construction of pipe-
lines leading from the Caspian Sea through Georgia and Turkey, for the first
time breaking Russia’s monopoly on the region’s rich oil and natural gas re-
                                                          
33 Catherine Powell, “Women and Girls in the Afghanistan Transition,” Council on Foreign 
Relations Working Paper, June 2014, http://www.cfr.org/women/women-girls-afghanistan-
transition/p33152.
34 USDS, “U.S. Support for the New Silk Road.”
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serves.”35 This was meant to solidify the sovereignty of newly independent
Central Asian states and counter the influence of Russia as well as China in
the region––thus feeding into the competitive “great game” in Central Asia.36
The events of September 11, 2001, however, changed the situation and
Washington’s long-term strategy was replaced by short-term military expedi-
ency. The more recent idea of the New Silk Road as a post-withdrawal eco-
nomic strategy emerged from discussions in think tanks in Washington and
was adopted in a condensed form by government policymakers––initially at
the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and, subsequently, at the more
skeptical State Department and White House.37 In particular, the new initia-
tive drew from experience and lessons learned in the war in Afghanistan,
particularly in regard to the issue of military logistics in the Afghan theater of
operations.  
In order to sustain its combat forces in Afghanistan, the U.S. has had to
deliver a wide range of materiel to the country. Initially, the majority of non-
lethal U.S. military materiel was delivered to the Pakistani port of Karachi
and then transported overland to Afghanistan by commercial trucking com-
panies. As a result of a number of disrupting factors, including a lack of in-
expensive alternatives, trucking strikes and increased insurgency activity, in
2009 the U.S. sought to establish a more flexible and reliable northern supply
network into Afghanistan to support the growing number of its forces. The
shutdown of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border following the death of several
Pakistani soldiers in a NATO incursion on Pakistani soil made clear that the
northern dimension was vital. 38 Through a combination of diplomatic pres-
sure and financial incentives, the U.S. was able to establish a number of lo-
                                                          
35 Joshua Kucera, “U.S. Checked in Central Asia,” International New York Times, November
4, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/05/opinion/us-checked-in-central-asia.html?_r=0. 
36 Mankoff, “The United States and Central Asia,” 21, and Ganguli, “The Revival of the Silk 
Roads Topic,” 67; and see also Ivan Safranchuk, “The New Silk Road Concept and 
American Policy in Greater Central Asia,” International Affairs 59, no. 5 (2013): 47–48. As 
Kucera points out, Henry Kissinger, for example, “called for the creation of a pro-Western 
‘buffer zone’ in the region separating Russia and China,” Joshua Kucera, “U.S. Checked in 
Central Asia.”
37 Graham Lee, “The New Silk Road and the Northern Distribution Network: A Golden Road 
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gistical routes that utilized existing rail and road networks as well as com-
mercial carriers in Europe, Russia and Central Asia. Together, these routes
constituted the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), illustrated in Figure
3.39
Figure 3: The Northern Distribution Network
Source: Kuchins et al. (2010). Illustration: Kauko Kyöstiö.
Given the successful transport of materiel through the NDN––according to
official reporting over 66,000 containers by May 201240––Washington’s
NSR strategy envisioned that the NDN could work as a foundation for re-
gional commercial interaction in the future. In May 2012 Susan M. Elliott,
the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of South and Central Asia,
argued that “[b]ecause we’re using existing infrastructure and commercial
transit routes, these same routes can and should be used by the private sector
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to continue trade across the region, where there is ample opportunity for
growth.” 41
Leading think tanks and Central Asia experts in Washington had argued 
precisely this point prior to the adoption of the NSR initiative. Frederick 
Starr and Andrew Kuchins, in particular, have been prominent in this respect. 
For example, in 2009 the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS) report by Kuchins et al. suggested that:
“By linking Afghanistan with Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia through
commercial carriers, existing infrastructure, and multiple routes, the NDN is
proof that the embattled country is currently accessible. Unfortunately, the flour-
ishing export trade of Afghan-grown opiates to Asia, Central Asia, Europe, Iran,
and Russia also serves as proof of transit potential. At the same time, the NDN is
creating additional demand for transcontinental transport services, bolstering the
logistical links between Afghanistan, NDN ports of origin, and NDN transit
states. Through this demand, the U.S. military is helping create and sustain trans-
continental transport capacity that could one day service the MSR [Modern Silk
Road] and become the engine for Afghanistan’s economic growth as prioritized
in the 2008 Afghan National Development Strategy.”42
In 2010, another CSIS contribution by Kuchins et al. argued that “[w]hile the
creation of the NDN was motivated by the U.S. military’s immediate logisti-
cal needs, its establishment nonetheless offers a unique opportunity for
Washington to lay a foundation for a Modern Silk Road, which would help
stabilize Afghanistan in the long term and transform Eurasia.”43 In the same
year, Starr and Kuchins together concluded more broadly that:
“The U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom radically changed [the] situation by
reopening Afghanistan‘s northern border to long-distance trade for the first time
since 1936, and by creating similar potential on Afghanistan‘s eastern border
with Pakistan. This action, entirely unintended and largely unnoticed in America
or elsewhere, is one of the most transformative developments on the Eurasian
landmass in the past century. Today, the best, and possibly only, way for Ameri-
ca to consolidate and expand its military gains in Afghanistan is to build on this
achievement.”44
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The New Silk Road concept, based on successful experience in commercial 
and logistics transactions towards the north and north-west along the NDN, 
was the model and way forward for the U.S., Afghanistan and greater Central 
Asia. Furthermore, as the U.S. was to withdraw the majority of its combat 
forces from Afghanistan, the existing NDN routes were to be used to 
transport out U.S. military equipment and, as such, they were expected to 
persist not only throughout the exit phase but also beyond it.
The Rationale for the U.S. Initiative: Goals in Afghanistan and 
Beyond 
The U.S. has had various security-related and geostrategic reasons for
launching the NSR initiative. As stated explicitly, the U.S. required a plan to
transition from a costly, security-oriented mission to a comprehensive but
less taxing long-term engagement with Afghanistan that would enable an
economically self-sustaining and extremism-averse Afghan society to emerge
in the context of an increasingly interconnected and interdependent Central
Asia. The costs of the absence of such a long-term plan or an “exit strategy”
were considered to be quite significant. First, gains in security and stability
would be short-lived if the U.S. and its Coalition partners abruptly were to
lose interest in Afghanistan. Second, the Afghan population would not be the
only party to draw the disillusioned conclusion that the U.S. is a self-
interested player unwilling to work for the Afghan goal of socio-economic
development. Third, non-engagement would also signal that the U.S. pres-
ence and interest in Central Asia was declining, thus creating further incen-
tives for Russia and China to increase their influence in the region. Fourth
and finally, a failure to accomplish the broader goal of a stable and self-
sustaining Afghanistan would be likely to undermine the willingness of
NATO and non-NATO partners to join U.S.-led missions in the future.45
Furthermore, the NSR initiative embodies broader U.S. geostrategic in-
terests in the region, among them the potentially growing strategic partner-
ship with India in combination with strategic rivalry between the U.S., China
and Russia. The Obama administration has defined India as its “indispensa-
ble partner” for the 21st century, based on converging strategic interests,
shared democratic values, and a common problem-solving mentality in re-
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gional and global affairs.46 However, political speech and practices have not
always coincided. The indispensable partnership has become tested in recent
years as the U.S. has “devoted less attention to India than to its rivals China
and Pakistan, pursuing economic links with the former and counterterrorism
ties with the other.”47 Nevertheless, India is still seen as an important region-
al leader as well as a democratic counterbalance to China in the Asia-Pacific
region, particularly in the maritime domain.48 The U.S. would like to consid-
er India as a key “pillar of economic and political stability in the Asia Pacif-
ic.”49 This strategic perspective explains why the U.S. NSR vision favors
vertical connections that seek to link Central Asia and Afghanistan to India
instead of the largest––and growing and expanding––market in the region,
namely China. This is expected to both enable the rise of India and to con-
strain the rise of China, including the Chinese expansion towards the west.
It is also worth noting that, despite its vertical design, the official NSR
strategy excludes both Russia and Iran from the equation––even if Russia did
facilitate the emergence and continuation of the NDN throughout the war in
Afghanistan. These exclusions reflect both the ongoing U.S. effort to limit
Russia’s influence in Central Asia, for example vis-à-vis Russia’s infrastruc-
ture (energy) and political projects (Custom’s and Eurasian Economic Union)
in the region, as well as the U.S. interest in limiting Iran’s participation in
potentially lucrative trade relations and in the stabilization of Afghanistan.50
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However, although the U.S. has not encouraged connections between Af-
ghanistan and Iran, it also has not banned them. In official statements the
U.S. has recognized, for example, “India’s historical linkages with Iran and
Persian culture” and understands “its interest in developing Iran as a gateway
to Afghanistan and Central Asia.”51 India’s possibilities to propose and exe-
cute road and rail projects connecting Afghanistan to the port of Chabahar in
Iran have not been restrained.
However, these efforts to limit Russian, Iranian and especially Chinese
influence in the region whilst simultaneously trying to develop and stabilize
Afghanistan through increased economic integration and activity are ex-
tremely challenging. If the stabilization of Afghanistan is premised on its
economic growth, and economic growth is to a large degree a function of
Afghanistan’s integration with the region and the region’s integration into
broader global markets, then it must also be noticed that Russia and particu-
larly China are geographically so favorably placed that they, too, play a role
in this process. Both of them, and more recently especially China, have al-
ready managed to penetrate the region and wield growing influence in Cen-
tral Asia. For example, Chinese investments in developing Turkmenistan’s
natural gas and Kazakhstan’s oil infrastructure provide China with leverage
over and beyond the competitive advantage that sheer geographic proximity
provides (more on this further below). Given the constraints on U.S. re-
sources due to the financial crisis and budgetary challenges coupled with a
lack of private sector investment, it is regional players and especially China
that are likely to fund many of the critical projects in the long term. This, in
turn, gives China a say in the content and consequences of such endeavors.52  
Whether this is necessarily a negative thing from the U.S. point of view
remains an open question. On the one hand, China’s significant investments
in the region do facilitate the region’s integration into the global economy as
well as its economic self-sufficiency––the two mechanisms that the U.S. em-
phasizes in the long-term development of Afghanistan and Central Asia. This
is something that U.S. official statements have come to recognize:
“We welcome the efforts of China to develop energy and transportation infra-
structure in the region, including projects announced during President Xi’s recent
[2013] visit. We see all these efforts as mutually reinforcing and beneficial to the
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Central Asia countries and Afghanistan. We are realistic. The United States is an
important partner for all the countries of the region, and our companies are major
players there […]. But China, as a neighbor to these countries and as a result of
its own dramatic growth, is naturally going to be leader there in trade and in-
vestment. We want to work with China […].”53
On the other hand, China has paid much less attention to Afghanistan and
much more attention to other Central Asian states than the U.S. did after 9/11
when Afghanistan was a strategic priority in the Global War on Terror. As a
consequence of this, Chinese influence in the region has grown as a function
of successful investments, mostly outside of Afghanistan and not necessarily
in favor of the development in Afghanistan that is the emphasis of the U.S.
China’s Silk Road Initiative
Two Roads in One Initiative: The Economic Belt and the Maritime 
Road
The idea of the Silk Road has a long history in China, dating back to the
original route(s) and its subsequent utilization in Chinese political discourse.
China has proposed its own concrete vision of the modern Silk Road that
imitates, yet goes beyond, the U.S. strategy initially suggested by Hillary
Clinton in 2011. The proposal includes both terrestrial and maritime roads
that connect China not only to Central Asia but much of the world, including
Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. The terrestrial part of this vision was
presented by President Xi Jinping in a speech at Nazarbayev University in
Astana, Kazakhstan, while visiting Central Asia in September 2013. Presi-
dent Xi proposed that China and the Central Asian countries build an “eco-
nomic belt along the Silk Road” that would span the Eurasian continent from
the Pacific to the Atlantic and the Baltic Sea––a massive economic area with
close to 3 billion people that “represents the biggest market in the world with
unparalleled potential.” 54 Later on, in a speech during his Southeast Asian
tour on October 3, President Xi spoke of the importance of a 21st-century
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maritime Silk Road. According to the vision, “the seaway that bridges China
and foreign countries is as prestigious as the Silk Road that connects the East
and West.”55 This maritime vision of the Silk Road was echoed almost simul-
taneously by the Chinese premier, Li Keqiang, in the October 2013 ASEAN-
China summit in Brunei, as a part of his seven-point proposal for cooperation
in the South-East Asian maritime domain.56
Figure 4: Chinese Silk Roads
Source: Xinhuanet (2015). Illustration: Kauko Kyöstiö.
More recently, the state owned Xinhua News Agency has provided one of the
few visual illustrations of the Chinese vision and particularly its immense
scope (Figure 4; see also Tiezzi 2014).57 The subsequent release of an offi-
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cial policy paper by China’s National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC) has elaborated on Chinese aspirations in more detail.58 It has be-
come obvious that China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative is not reducible
to the two specific terrestrial and maritime routes suggested in Xinhua’s im-
age. In fact, already in his 2013 speech on the “economic belt,” President Xi
put forward a five-point proposal to develop the broader economic area to
strengthen relations between China, Central Asia and Europe. This proposal
emphasized increased policy communication to help joint economic coopera-
tion, the development of transport and other networks to facilitate intra- and
intercontinental trade, and the improvement of trade relations by eliminating
trade barriers and reducing trade and investment costs. Two more highlights
were the enhancement of financial cooperation with the aim of decreasing
transaction costs and reducing financial risks and the strengthening of cultur-
al relations, for example through government-sponsored scholarships, study
tours and various kinds of cultural events.59
Policy communication, infrastructure development and financial cooper-
ation are currently the three most topical embodiments and tools of the Silk
Road initiative. In order to establish a favorable political environment, China
has engaged in active high-level political dialogue with prospective partners
along the maritime and terrestrial Silk Roads. It has established strategic
partnerships with all five Central Asian states (Kazakhstan in 2005 and 2011,
Uzbekistan in 2012 and Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan in 2013) as
well as with ASEAN countries (Malaysia in 2013 and Indonesia in 2005 and
2013).60 The typical policy is that bilateral relations are upgraded to strategic
partnerships and coupled with mutually beneficial (“win-win”) economic
cooperation and projects. Concretely, this has meant infrastructure develop-
ment to facilitate economic flows and ultimately also Chinese economic and
political influence along the two Silk Roads. Through financing and by car-
rying out construction projects China continues to pursue the establishment
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of a vast network of international connections: transport corridors overland
(roads, high-speed railways) and at sea (sea routes), oil and natural gas pipe-
lines as well as extraction infrastructure, telecommunications infrastructure
(“Information Silk Road”), airports and ports, special economic zones, and
so on.61
In regard to the “economic belt” across Central Asia, in particular, these
include more localized initiatives with strategic value, such as the establish-
ment of an agricultural free trade zone along the Xinjiang-Tajikistan border62
and the establishment of the Kashgar special economic zone63. They also
include broader, regional and trans-regional initiatives with strategic signifi-
cance, such as: the Kazakhstan–China oil pipeline that bypasses Russia and
transports Caspian oil directly to China64; the Central Asia–China gas pipe-
line that bypasses Russia’s Gazprom-Transneft network and transports natu-
ral gas from Turkmenistan via Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to China’s new
West-East pipeline65; the establishment of a China-Pakistan overland
transport corridor between Kashgar and the Chinese-operated port of Gwadar
in Pakistan in order to provide China with alternative access to Middle East-
ern oil66; the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railroad that could move Chinese
low-value goods from Xinjiang to Central Asia and bring Central Asian
products, such as uranium from Uzbekistan, to China67; and the China-
Europe railroad to connect inland China to Central Europe (illustrations in
Figures 5 and 6).68
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Figure 5: China-Central Asia Transport and Energy Connections.
Source: Stratfor (2013). Illustration: Kauko Kyöstiö.
To facilitate infrastructure development, China has not only financed projects
bilaterally (e.g. loans as prepayments of natural resources), but also moved to
establish new funding mechanisms. In November 2014, China announced the
establishment of a $40 billion Silk Road Fund, managed by Chinese policy
banks, to fund infrastructure, resource extraction, industrial and financial
cooperation projects along the two Silk Roads. In the previous month repre-
sentatives of 21 Asian nations had gathered in Beijing to sign a memorandum
of understanding on establishing a new multilateral Asian Infrastructure In-
vestment Bank (AIIB)––a Chinese alternative to the Asian Development
Bank dominated by Japan––with capital of $50 billion to finance various
infrastructure projects in the greater Asian region.69 Simultaneously the es-
tablishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization financing institution
is under discussion amongst the member states.70
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The Rationale for the Chinese Initiative: Broad Objectives in 
Geostrategic Contexts  
In order to understand China’s Silk Road initiative, we must see it as a part
of a broader and ongoing Chinese westward expansion––“March to West”71
or “Pivot to West”72––that began with a domestic focus. As Wang explains,
modern China’s strategic attention has been directed at its coastal areas in the
east. When China began to open up, contact with Western powers and Japan
took place primarily by maritime routes, which resulted in the placing of
many of the Chinese cities and its industry on the East coast. This led to an
accumulation of population and wealth in coastal regions. The establishment
of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in south-east China further emphasized
this focus. These developments meant that throughout much of China’s mod-
ern history, its Western regions have remained socio-economically backward
as well as lacking contact with the rest of the world.73
Beginning with the launch of the Great Western Development Strategy
by the central government in 2000, China began to pay serious economic
attention to developing its Western regions.74 This regional modernization
and industrialization has borne economic fruits. One expert sees “the begin-
nings of an economic boom in the inland provinces, producing a particularly
noticeable impact since 2010.”75 As a consequence, migration flows to the
more industrialized coastal area have lessened as work has become available
closer by (thereby contributing to labor shortage and a rise in salaries in the
East). Furthermore, increased economic activity has resulted in increased
demand for energy that could be found close by and through much more di-
rect supply routes from the Middle East and Central Asia.
The development strategy is related to the Chinese aim to secure territo-
rial integrity and maintain political stability in its Western regions, most no-
tably in the multiethnic Xinjiang borderland region that rebelled from the
Republic in the interwar-period and remains the home of a critical and politi-
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cally active Uighur population.76 The official Chinese policy assumes that
the promotion of rapid economic development––supported by massive state
investments and subsidies––coupled with increased contact with the east will
change local ethnic and cultural identities over time, thus decreasing the dan-
ger of regional political instability or outright separatism. China has also not
shied away from using coercion in the region to suppress Uighur organiza-
tions with either nationalist or separatist agendas––to combat what the Chi-
nese consider the “three evils” of religious extremism, separatism and terror-
ism. Since the early 2000s, China has advanced regional security cooperation
through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to combat these
“evils” in its Western parts and beyond in Central Asia.77
Today, the Chinese march to the West is increasingly international in
character. China is not ignorant of political instability due to ethnic tensions,
intertwined borderlands and border disputes, and the presence of the “three
evils” close by in Central Asia. In particular, China fears a potential “domino
effect” in which instability in neighboring states would spill over into West-
ern China. Much like in Xinjiang, China has an interest in stabilizing the re-
gion through a combination of improved political relations, economic devel-
opment and security cooperation. The first of these is pursued with strategic
partnerships, the second through growing economic investments in the re-
gion, particularly in the hydrocarbon sector and infrastructure projects, and
the third through multilateral cooperation in the SCO in order to improve its
regional capability in fighting the “three evils.”78
The Chinese march to the West is also related to a broader geostrategic
scenario within which China finds itself confronting foreign powers. While
China remains broadly committed to the global liberal economic order, it
pursues regional hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. To counter the rise of China
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in general and in the Asia-Pacific in particular, the U.S. has been rebalancing
its strategic attention to the region.79 This has meant that China increasingly
perceives itself as being a target of a comprehensive U.S. policy of “con-
tainment” pursued through strengthening military partnerships and efforts to
undermine Sino-ASEAN political relations as well as Chinese-led regional
economic integration, notably the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific
(FTAAP) through the promotion of the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP). In this potentially zero-sum situation, where both the U.S. and China
are seeking to expand (or at least maintain) their own influence in the region,
China recognizes the danger of an open confrontation with the U.S. and pur-
sues a policy that combines gradual military build-up at home with new polit-
ico-economic diplomacy abroad.80
A growing geostrategic emphasis on regions to the west of China––
including Central Asia and the Middle East––currently presents the leader-
ship in Beijing with a more favorable option than open U.S.-Sino confronta-
tion, with much less to lose and much more to gain. The U.S. withdrawal
from Iraq and Afghanistan opens up geopolitical and geo-economic space
into which China can advance and from which it can reap economic (re-
source extraction, market penetration), political (conversion of economic
influence into political power) and security (development of Central Asian
countries) benefits with almost no risk of a direct military confrontation be-
tween the two––something that is much more difficult to achieve in the Asia-
Pacific. Although China’s Silk Road initiative is a rival to the U.S. economic
strategy, there is potential for a cooperative U.S.-China relationship in the
region, for example because of common interests in economic investment,
energy issues, counterterrorism and maintaining regional stability as a whole.
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In Afghanistan, in particular, the U.S. has signaled that China could contrib-
ute more to the stabilization of the country.81
As China has become an important investment and trade partner in Cen-
tral Asian states, Beijing’s vision of the “economic belt” also contests Mos-
cow’s attempt to establish the multi-dimensionally challenged Eurasian Eco-
nomic Union82 in the region. While sharing the strategic interest of counter-
ing U.S. hegemony, Moscow is uneasy about a significant expansion of Chi-
nese economic reach including energy and transport links to Central Asia that
will not only diminish Russia’s economic footprint but will also be converted
into Chinese political power in Russia’s traditional sphere of influence,
thereby reducing its role to that of a mere “junior partner” for Beijing.83 As a
result of the crisis in Ukraine, Russia has found itself increasingly isolated
from the West and it has turned its attention to the east and, particularly, to
China. This has meant new energy deals and investments from China––
notably for expensive hydrocarbon extraction projects in eastern Siberia and
the Arctic––with terms that may turn out to be unfavorable to Russia.
As a growing market, China expresses rising demand for a stable and se-
cure supply of energy from alternative sources. As a consequence of this,
access to energy reserves in Central Asia has become increasingly important
for China.84 This has also suited Central Asian countries, which have been
looking for new export markets so as to reduce their dependence on Russia.85
From this perspective, President Xi’s tour in the region in September 2013
was illustrative. During the trip, a range of investment, trade and loan agree-
ments were reached with strategic partnership countries, in total worth over
$50 billion. Oil-rich Kazakhstan was the prime target of the trip with deals
amounting to up to $30 billion, primarily related to oil extraction and the
transport thereof. China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) invested $5
billion in the Kashagan offshore oil field in the Caspian Sea from which oil is
transported to China via existing pipeline infrastructure (Figure 5). Another
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set of agreements was reached in Uzbekistan where Beijing and Tashkent
completed oil, gas and uranium deals worth of $15 billion. In Turkmenistan,
China’s interests were primarily related to the expansion of production and
supply of Turkmen natural gas to China. The Turkmen government pledged
to supply China with an additional 25 billion cubic meters of natural gas an-
nually by 2020, and in return Beijing agreed to finance the redevelopment of
the massive Galkynysh gas field––the second largest in the world––and addi-
tional pipeline projects to carry the increased supply to China.86
Figure 6: Central Asia–China Oil and Gas Infrastructure
Source: Cooley (2012). Illustration: Kauko Kyöstiö.
Until the early 1990s, China was self-sufficient in oil. With subsequent
growth rates exceeding 10 percent per year, it soon became dependent on
foreign oil.87 In 2009, China became the second-largest consumer of oil after
the U.S. and, assuming continued economic growth, it will surpass the U.S.
in the near future. While coal remains the primary source of energy (around
70 percent), a significant part of the total energy consumption in China––18
percent in 2011––is covered by oil. China’s overall demand of oil reached
10.7 million barrels per day (bbl/d) in 2013 and more than half of it––circa
5.6 million bbl/d––was imported to China. According to 2011 statistics, the
single largest exporter of oil to China is Saudi Arabia, with a volume of over
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1 million bbl/d, whereas Iran with 0.5 million and Iraq with 0.27 million
bbl/d are also important sources of oil for China.88 In conjunction with the
worst-case geostrategic scenario in which the U.S. would cut the supply of
oil by blocking the Strait of Malacca, this increases the importance of alter-
native transport routes for Middle Eastern and African oil.
To alleviate its over-reliance on the Asia-Pacific maritime routes, China
has investigated the possibility of an alternative maritime corridor (Northern
Sea Route), energy sources (Yamal LNG) and logistics hubs (Iceland) in the
opening Arctic.89 It has also invested in the development of transport and
energy infrastructure as well as logistic hubs on land in order to bypass the
Strait of Malacca. We have already mentioned the transport corridor between
Kashgar (Xinjiang) and the Gwadar port in Pakistan. In April 2015, President
Xi unveiled infrastructure and energy projects, worth $46 billion in total, for
its establishment as an economic corridor with road infrastructure, railways
and oil and gas pipelines. Previously China had already invested in the de-
velopment of the trans-shipment terminal in Gwadar, with several multipur-
pose berths and oil terminals. In 2013, China took over operational control of
the port as the Singaporean company, PSA International, was replaced by the
state-run Chinese Overseas Port Holdings (COPHC).90
Finally, China also has a long-term interest in developing transport infra-
structure to facilitate trade flows connecting growing Western China with the
global market place. In its immediate neighborhood, Central Asia exhibits
some potential for economic growth91 which China has an interest of tapping
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into, at least by providing the region’s markets with low-cost products from
western Chinese manufacturing sites. However, other markets, most notably
those in Europe, are the main target. This requires the establishment of a
comprehensive land-based transport network consisting of highways and
high-speed railroads to Eastern and Central Europe. In rail transport, this has
already started to become a reality when the China-Europe railroad from
Zhengzhou in Henan province to Hamburg, Germany was inaugurated in
2013. While certainly not a full-blown alternative to maritime logistics, con-
tinental railways do provide some economic incentives as it reduces the time
(by 2 weeks) and expenses (by 25 percent) for transporting certain manufac-
turing goods from China to Europe. The savings in expenses are even higher
when compared to air logistics. The electronics company Foxconn, computer
manufacturer Hewlett-Packard and the logistics company DHL already uti-
lize this railway to ship their products from western Chinese manufacturing
sites to European markets. 92
Silk Road Initiatives and the Future of Central Asia
What future should one expect for Central Asia in the light of these two 
strategic Silk Road initiatives? While both rely primarily on the 
establishment of resource and trade flows and related infrastructure, the 
strategies suggest two alternative approaches for organizing the practices that 
make economic and political space in Central Asia. The U.S. Silk Road 
initiative emerges from the specific problem of Afghanistan and amounts to a 
limited regional economic strategy that emphasizes vertical (North-South) 
terrestrial interconnectivity between Central Asia and India, i.e. energy and 
logistic connections between land-locked Central Asian countries and India 
with Afghanistan as the gateway and benefactor in between. The current 
strategy, as discussed, is derived from the experience of the Northern 
Distribution Network during the war in Afghanistan. Paradoxically, though, 
the NDN was more extensive in scope and varied in direction as its routes 
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shipped U.S. military equipment through Europe, the Caucasus and Russia to 
Afghanistan.93 In the interest of facilitating regional interconnectivity in 
Central Asia, the U.S. strategy is a politically multilateral approach that seeks 
to leverage the cooperation of regional states (as responsible stakeholders), 
international organizations (the World Bank) and the private sector, with the 
latter two serving as primary sources of finance.
China’s Silk Road initiative differs from the U.S. version in crucial 
aspects. First, it is more varied in nature, including the maritime and 
terrestrial parts, the latter of which contains various routes for logistic and 
resource flows. It is also significantly broader in scope, consisting of routes 
that span not only the Eurasian continent but also the whole of the southern 
maritime route to Africa, the Middle East and Europe. And lastly, it is 
primarily horizontal (East-West) in its direction of interconnectivity, and 
aims to connect China to European commodity markets as well as to African, 
Middle Eastern and Central Asian resource bases. 
All this suggests that the Chinese Silk Road strategy is not merely the 
manifestation of a “neighborhood policy”94 designed to create a favorable 
geopolitical environment in Central (economic belt) and South-East 
(maritime road) Asia, but also reflects China’s global approach to secure its 
own economic growth and political stability (“go out” policy), and through 
them, its growing global political aspirations. The focus on adjacent 
geopolitical regions such as Central Asia can be seen as a necessary step in 
China’s broader objectives in the long term. In this respect, and again unlike 
the U.S., China’s political approach emphasizes bilateral strategic 
partnerships, such as those China has formed in Central Asia, through which 
a favorable geopolitical climate can be established. China also emphasizes 
public capital to fund costly infrastructure projects with these strategic 
partners. This is even the case with the establishment of the new multilateral 
Asian financial instrument in which China, as the leading country, assumes 
the greatest burden in financing.
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Of these differing strategies, it is the Chinese initiative that is currently 
the more feasible one––at least if regarded through the prisms of resource 
commitments, security and regional geopolitics. First, in terms of resource 
commitments China has been remarkably successful in implementing 
difficult and costly infrastructure projects by combining strategic partnership 
with significant, and mutually beneficial, public funding (and often-imported 
workforce) with various key countries, notably in Central Asia. The newly 
established Silk Road Fund and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
further highlight Chinese seriousness about implementing the strategy and its 
numerous projects. The U.S., on the other hand, has struggled to match 
financial commitments with great ambitions, such as the TAPI gas pipeline 
and the CASA-1000 energy network that remain “work-in-progress.” Much 
of the U.S.’s reticence stems from post-2008 economic challenges, the 
memory of high financial––as well as human and political––costs of its 
engagement to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan for over a decade, and a 
domestic political environment opposed to new costly involvement abroad.95
The U.S. has directly supported the flagship CASA-1000 project with a mere 
$15 million following the March 2014 commitment of $526 million by the 
World Bank (in which, however, the U.S. remains a major donor).96 This 
captures the current U.S. sentiment that Silk Road projects are to be realized 
“with limited government support.” 97
Second, the Chinese Silk Road initiative––particularly its terrestrial 
“economic belt” across Central Asia––suffers less than the U.S. strategy 
from the increasingly fragile security situation in Afghanistan.98 Apart from 
relatively limited Chinese investments in Afghanistan, notably in its 
resources sector, the majority of Chinese hard infrastructure projects bypass 
Afghanistan and are directed to other Central Asian countries, such as 
Kazakhstan for oil and Turkmenistan for gas, or beyond Central Asia 
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altogether. Furthermore, as Chinese have been reluctant to become involved 
in the Afghan stability operation and have, in fact, had a long relationship 
with the Taliban (and their de facto sponsor, Pakistan), they are less likely 
than U.S. forces or projects to become the target of anti-government violence 
to begin with. Much like in South Sudan, China even appears to have sought 
to broker a deal between the Taliban and the Afghan government by hosting 
Taliban representatives in China.99 Simultaneously China has its own 
problem with indigenous Uighur Muslim separatists in Xinjiang that have 
connections to groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan (and in bordering Central 
Asian countries). Thus, the fragile security situation in Afghanistan does 
affect via proxy the western part of China through which infrastructure 
projects enter and exit China.
By contrast, the U.S. Silk Road strategy is particularly vulnerable to the 
security situation in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is the “heart” of the whole 
strategy, and insecurity in the country undermines the economic, social and 
political recovery of the country in general. Furthermore, key infrastructure 
projects of the U.S. strategy––the TAPI gas line and the CASA-1000 energy 
network––are to pass through volatile Afghan and Pakistani territory where 
continued insecurity will risk financial prospects and practical 
implementation.100 This entails that stability in the country is paramount for 
the successful execution of the strategy; such is not the case and the U.S. has 
found itself faced with a conundrum. Moreover, given the currently limited 
capability of Afghan security forces, full withdrawal would be likely to 
create a security vacuum in which anti-government and other radical groups 
could achieve territorial control at least in certain parts of Afghanistan, thus 
annulling the effort of the U.S. and the coalition forces over the course of 
more than a decade to stabilize the country as well as endangering any
prospect for economic recovery envisaged in the Silk Road initiative.
In order to respond to resurging violence, Afghan security forces have 
decided to resume the controversial “night raids” into private homes––
banned in 2013 by President Karzai due to their offensive nature––in order to 
hit the Taliban when and where they are at their most vulnerable. However, 
Afghan forces lack the capability to execute this effectively, thereby 
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prompting President Obama to quietly continue limited combat operations 
with the remaining U.S. forces in Afghanistan. This means in particular the 
provision of “combat enabler support,” including air support, transportation, 
intelligence, and communications that are critical in mobile night raids.101
Whether this will solve the security problem remains to be seen but appears 
unlikely, given that even the 2009 surge was not able to accomplish this.
Third, while the antagonistic regional geopolitical situation remains 
challenging for both strategies, the Chinese are, and have already been, more 
successful than the U.S. in navigating these stormy waters. By relying on 
bilateral partnerships and lucrative financial arrangements, the Chinese have 
clearly recognized that Central Asia, where the former Soviet republics are 
particularly wary about defending their sovereignty and where conflicts have 
erupted over poorly demarcated borderlines and strategically important water 
resources and hydropower installations102, is not likely to become a unitary 
regional grouping with aligned policies. Moreover, by involving all countries 
China has not only succeeded in diversification but has also established 
incentives for national elites to secure Chinese projects, even amidst rising 
nationalistic fears of “Chinese take-over” or poor employment practices in 
the region.103 Furthermore, as Chinese investments are not conditional on 
social transformation, e.g. the promotion of democracy or human/gender 
rights, not only are the Chinese more welcome among many of the region’s 
elites, but China itself considers to have contributed to regional security by 
bolstering national economic development and the resources of governments 
and local elites.
While the U.S. did pursue bilateral arrangements, including substantive 
and often murky financial compensation, with Central Asian governments 
and elites during the war in Afghanistan, most notably in order to secure 
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important military bases and fuel supply104, the U.S. Silk Road strategy has 
pursued a multilateral approach that overestimates the potential for trust and
cooperation in a divided and conflict-prone region––particularly so in the 
absence of direct U.S. financial compensation and strong diplomatic 
pressure. For example, disputes over water resources and hydropower 
installations are likely to affect negatively the finalization of the CASA-1000
project that ought to transport hydropower from Central Asia all the way to 
India. Moreover, the U.S. approach has also overestimated the willingness of 
private investors given both Afghan insecurity and regional geopolitical 
uncertainty. The U.S. initiative has also included elements of social 
transformation, e.g. in relation to human rights/gender issues, the fight 
against corruption and improved border control, that may be difficult to 
accomplish in some countries, the former because of enduring patriarchal 
practices and fears of bottom-up democratization processes and the latter two 
due to the systemic nature of corruption.105 Conditionality is unlikely to 
advance U.S. efforts.
Regional geopolitics is further complicated by the presence of a third 
great power, Russia. While the collapse of the Soviet Union meant the loss of 
Russia’s formal authority over the five Central Asian countries, China 
recognizes Russia as a notable player in the region in various relevant 
spheres.106 First, and foremost, Russia leads the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) and continues to have a notable military presence in 
the region, including bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Russia also has 
already existing economic and energy relations, and has been pursuing 
regional integration through the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic 
Union (EEU, alternatively abbreviated EAEU), even if the future of this 
project is uncertain.107
Both the U.S. and Chinese Silk Road initiatives can be read as geo-
economic alternatives to the EEU. While the U.S. Silk Road strategy 
explicitly excludes Russia––and given current East-West tensions this is 
unlikely to change––the Chinese have remained relatively ambiguous about 
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possible cooperation or conflict (of interest) between the “economic belt” 
and the EEU. After the EEU entered into force in January 2015, Foreign 
Minister Wang Yi stated that China was open to “win-win” cooperation with 
all interested parties, no matter whether they were countries or 
organizations.108 It also must be noted that although China’s interest lies in 
maintaining stability in Central Asia, it has no willingness to pursue the role 
of being a security guarantor in the region and, thus, is prepared to 
accommodate Russia. Offering economic lifelines to Russia serves China in 
two key respects: first, it seeks to guarantee that Russia remains a strategic 
partner in its opposition to the U.S. on the global scene without jeopardizing 
China’s strategic interest in maintaining access to Western markets; and 
second, by bolstering the “economic belt” it further undermines the already 
challenged U.S. Silk Road initiative in Central Asia.
Conclusion
Our analysis shows how both the U.S. and China emphasize the 
establishment of resource and logistical connectivity in their respective 
strategies and how the suggested direction, scope and means of establishment 
are unique in each. By seeking to establish energy and logistics 
infrastructure, the U.S. Silk Road initiative amounts to a regional and
multilateral economic strategy along the vertical axis; it aims to connect 
resources that can be extracted from the Central Asian countries to emerging 
and energy-hungry markets in Pakistan and India, with Afghanistan as the 
critical gateway and benefactor in-between. The Chinese initiative again 
leverages primarily bilateral relations and state-funding to establish mutually 
beneficial, complex horizontal infrastructure connectivity not only in Chinese 
neighborhood, such as in Central Asia, but also beyond, all the way to 
Europe and Africa. So far, Afghanistan has been a relatively minor part of 
Chinese investments, but the withdrawal of the majority of U.S. forces and 
the continuously fragile security situation are likely to demand increased 
attention from China, too. Based on resource, security, and geopolitical 
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considerations, the Chinese strategic initiative is likely to be the more 
significant external driver of transformation in Central Asia in the near 
future. 
Although it remains uncertain whether the individual projects (and either 
of the initiatives as a whole) will meet all the expectations attached to them, 
the practical implications of these developments also have a more general 
significance. The Silk Road initiatives suggest that the contemporary 
geopolitical environment in Central Asia is increasingly organized, and 
defined, by the development of hard (and soft) infrastructure as well as the 
emerging and strengthening force of regional and global flows through them. 
This implies a strategic shift of balance away from traditional geopolitics 
emphasizing the significance of separate territorial entities and strict 
borders109 towards also taking into account the interconnections in energy 
and logistics networks, and with them new dependencies and 
interdependencies, within and across existing politico-juridical boundaries in 
the region. All sovereign actors discussed above rely on various strategic 
flows to a growing degree, even if that degree differs from case to case. At 
the same time, their abilities to establish, maintain and ultimately secure 
these networks of infrastructure and flows––precisely the kinds of abilities 
which are central to state power in today’s “geopolitics of flows”110––differ 
from each other and depend on their positions and resources within the 
network. The search for these positions, and the accumulation of resources 
by inviting external assistance and investment so as to open critical 
bottlenecks, is in full swing in Central Asia. Despite already existing in 
Western policies linked to Afghanistan, this wider reorganization of the 
whole region has gathered its own momentum and provided Afghanistan 
with an instrumental role as a geographic gateway and as a political cause in 
which to engage in developing the region. 
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